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n a modern economy, a large fraction of payments for goods and services
involve the services of one or more banks. The provision of payment
services is, in fact, one of the distinguishing characteristics of banks. A
bank-intermediated payment instrument, such as a check, typically commu-
nicates instructions to the buyer’s bank to make payment to the seller or the
seller’s bank. Often, then, we think of payment services as being bundled
with the deposit services provided by banks, although this is not always the
case. Credit cards, for instance, involve payments by the card-issuing bank,
at which the cardholder need not hold deposits. Still, many payment services
do arise naturally as byproducts of holding deposits with a bank, and some
authors have recently begun to focus on this payments function in the theory
of banking (McAndrews and Roberds 1999; Prescott and Weinberg 2000).
Checks and debit cards are prominent examples of such payment services, but
ATM service, which gives people remote access to cash from their deposit
accounts, is also an example even though ATM transactions facilitate pur-
chases with cash, not bank liabilities. Accordingly, the industrial organization
of the payment services industry, and even the characteristics of the payment
services provided, will generally depend on the organization of the banking
industry itself.
One area in which the structure of the banking industry matters for the
nature of payment services is that of interbank payments—payments in which
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theservicesofmorethanonebankarerequired. Inaneconomywherebanking
isdominatedbyaveryfewinstitutions, theremaybearelativelylargenumber
of transactions in which the buyer and the seller have deposits with the same
bank. In these cases, interbank payments are not necessary. On the other
hand, if there are many banks and people frequently engage in transactions
with customers of diverse institutions, then many payments will be interbank
payments, requiring the services of both the buyer’s and the seller’s banks. In
these cases each bank provides services to both its own and the other bank’s
depositors. Theinterbankpaymentservicesthatonebankprovidestoanother’s
depositors resemble the interconnection services that allow customers of one
communication network to connect with those of a second network.1
In an environment in which banks compete for depositors, the terms on
which they make interbank services available can be powerful strategic tools.
By making interconnection very costly, a bank could dissuade potential de-
positors from placing deposits with competing banks. Such surcharges for
interbank services create inefﬁciency by exceeding the resource costs of pro-
viding those services. Hence, there is potential tension between a bank’s need
to compete for depositors and its need to cooperate in interconnection in order
to enhance the quality of its service. The implications of this tension depend
on the market structure and the nature of competition in the banking industry.
In a perfectly competitive, or perfectly “contestable” market, there is strong
reason to expect efﬁcient outcomes, even taking the network characteristics
of payment services into account (Weinberg 1997). Competition, however,
may be limited by regulatory or other features of the economic environment.
For instance, in the United States, banking was historically segmented along
geographiclinesbyanarrayofbranchingrestrictions. InJapan, suchsegmen-
tation was perhaps even more extensive, with different classes of institutions
having speciﬁed sets of services or classes of customers they could serve (Ito
1992). In both of these countries, old barriers between market segments have
eroded, increasing the opportunities for direct competition among a wider
array of banks. Still, in many economies, limits to competition may remain.
In a segmented environment, the terms of interbank payment arrange-
ments can have at most a limited effect on the competition among banks for
depositors. The main concern in such an environment, then, would be the
provision of the common resource represented by a comprehensive interbank
network. Any conﬂicts of interest among banks would be mainly related to
differences in the value that different banks placed on having access to such a
network. Forinstance,inabankingsysteminwhichlocalclearinghousesplay
an important role in payments within a region, a primary role of an interre-
gional network is to connect the various clearing houses. Accordingly, banks
thatservelimitedgeographicareaswillbemostinterestedintheservicesofan
1 Laffont and Tirole (1998a,b) study interconnection pricing among rival telecommunication
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interregionalinterbanknetwork. InJapan, wheretherehavetraditionallybeen
bothregionalandnationwidebanks, thevalueofparticipatinginaninterbank,
interregional network is likely smaller for the latter than for the former. A
large, nationwide bank could use its own internal branch network to make
connections among the various clearing houses. A bank with geographically
limited operations, however, could beneﬁt from having access to a national
network. Indeed, in the 1940s, when the national clearing system was ﬁrst
established, regional banks took the greatest interest in its development, ac-
cording to Tsurumi (1999). By way of contrast, the United States had no
nationwide banks at the time of the founding of the Federal Reserve System,
and the banks that lobbied for the Fed to create a national network for clearing
interregionalcheckswereprimarilylargebanksinlargecities(Lacker,Walker,
and Weinberg 1999).
The pricing of interbank payment services typically falls into one of two
broad categories: cooperative or independent. Independent pricing simply
means that each bank sets the price for its own interbank services. Fees for
clearing and settling checks were set independently in the period prior to the
Fed’s dominance of the check-clearing system. A contemporary example is
the surcharge imposed by a bank for an ATM withdrawal by another bank’s
depositor. Cooperativeprice-settingusuallytakestheformofinterbankprices
set by a group or consortium of banks. Interchange fees in a payment card or
ATM network are examples of this sort of cooperation.
It is generally accepted that cooperation among competing ﬁrms in the
setting of prices can enable sellers to achieve higher prices and proﬁts than
they could obtain with independent pricing. This increase in proﬁts comes at
the expense of consumer welfare and economic efﬁciency. This principle is,
of course, the basis for antitrust policy. On the other hand, when ﬁrms with
some market power sell complementary goods, then cooperation can result
in lower prices. When it bundles deposit and payment services, a bank is




setting of interbank prices in alternative market environments. I focus specif-
ically on the pricing of interbank payment services when deposit markets are
segmented, as compared to when banks compete directly for deposits. An
important qualiﬁcation of this discussion is that it takes the structure of the
banking market, given by the set of potential market participants, as ﬁxed.
That is, I do not consider the effects of free entry or potential competition.
In essence, then, the article explores how changes in the degree of imperfect
competition affect the comparison of cooperative and independent pricing.
I address the question of how interbank pricing might respond to a change
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termsandtheninthecontextofasimplemodelofbankcompetitionandinter-
connection. The main insight drawn from this discussion can be summarized
as follows. Cooperation in the setting of interbank prices typically leads to
lower interbank prices and greater consumer welfare and proﬁts when deposit
markets are segmented. On the other hand, when banks compete directly for
deposits, cooperation in setting interbank prices can have the effect of damp-
eningcompetitioninthedepositmarket, givenaﬁxedsetofcompetitors. This
could result in higher interbank prices and reduced consumer welfare.
1. THE ELEMENTS OFAN INTERBANK PRICING GAME
I begin by describing a model of price competition between two banks facing
demands for deposits and interbank payment services. The demand structure
speciﬁed below can be derived from a more detailed economic environment
involvingtheneedforagentstoengagesometimesinstorageandconsumption
activities at physically distinct locations.2 The same general structure would
arise in any economic environment in which a diverse set of buyers and sell-
ers of goods and services acquire both deposit and transaction services from
potentially competing banks. While models adapted from the telecommuni-
cations literature can ﬁt into this framework, the general structure allows for
some additional important features. Speciﬁcally, and as will be shown by the
example in Section 2, this framework can accommodate differences between
competing banks. This is a useful feature since many discussions of compe-
tition among banks focus on the relative competitive positions of large and
small banks.
Demand Functions and Prices
Consider a market in which two banks raise deposits that can be used to make
payments in the purchase of goods. To be concrete, focus on the market for
household deposits and the payment services provided by banks to house-
holds for making purchases from ﬁrms. Also, in the interest of simplicity,
suppose that ﬁrms are exogenously assigned to banks, some with each bank.
A consumer selects a bank at which to deposit; the consumer’s choice will
affect the set of ﬁrms to which it can costlessly make payments. If we assume
that consumers are randomly matched with ﬁrms for the purpose of making
purchases, then each consumer faces some chance that he or she will need to
make a purchase from a ﬁrm that does not use his or her bank. Completion
of such a transaction will require an interbank transaction, in which the ﬁrm’s
bank credits the ﬁrm’s account and collects funds from the consumer’s bank.
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In order to examine interbank pricing and competition, the description
of this market structure must specify demand functions for bank services.
Labeling the banks 0 and 1, let zi represent the number of depositors attracted
by bank i, and let xi represent the number of interbank transactions entered
into by a customer of bank i.3 These quantities will respond to the prices set
bythetwobanks. Assumethateachbanksetstwoprices, onepricefordeposit
services that also covers all same-bank payments and another price for each
interbank transaction. Let bank i’s price for deposit services be denoted by pi
and let its price for an interbank transaction be given by qi. More precisely,
banki collectspi fromeachconsumerwhoplacesdepositswithitandcollects
qi from the other bank’s depositors for each purchase they make from ﬁrms
that use bank i.A more general pricing structure would allow a bank to charge
transaction fees to its own depositors as well as to its rival’s depositors. The
simpler structure speciﬁed here is sufﬁcient to capture the combination of




placetheirfunds. Finally, depositorsmakepurchases. Ifadepositorwishesto
make a purchase from a seller that is associated with a different bank, then the
depositorneedstheservicesoftheseller’sbanktocompletethepurchase. The
depositor values both the consumption of goods purchased and the deposits
left over after buying goods and paying bank fees.
In general, one can assume that both the number of depositors a bank
attracts and the number of interbank transactions it services will be functions
of the full set of prices, (p0,p 1,q 0,q 1). In choosing a bank, a depositor will
weigh the value of depositing at bank 0 against the value of depositing at bank
1 and against the value of not using banking services at all. The value to a
depositor of placing deposits with bank i depends on (pi,q j). The demand
for deposits at bank 1 (z1) is decreasing in p1 and q0 and either independent
of or increasing in p0 and q1.5 An increase in q0 causes this demand to fall
because q0 is the price paid by bank 1’s depositors when they must make a
purchase from a customer of bank 0. The dependence of z1 on p0 and q1 is
determined by the degree to which the two banks’ markets for deposits are
segmented. Segmentation of the markets could be the result of fundamental
demandcharacteristics,suchasthedegreetowhichconsumersﬁndthedeposit
services of the two banks to be good substitutes. Market segmentation could
3 This speciﬁcation treats zi as both the number of depositors and the value of deposits
attracted. Hence, each consumer is assumed to have one unit of funds available for deposit.
4 The interaction between interbank pricing and the pricing of services to one’s own depositors
under more general pricing structures is qualitatively similar to that presented in this article.
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also arise from artiﬁcial barriers to competition, such as legal rules that limit
the set of consumers a particular bank (or type of bank) may serve.
If there are no consumers who could reasonably choose to bank at either
bank, then the markets are fully segmented and p0 and q1 will have no effect
on z1. If, on the other hand, the two banks compete directly for at least some
customers, then z1 is increasing in p0 and q1, which determine the cost of
depositing with bank 0.
For a given depositor at bank 1, the demand for interbank transactions
depends only on q0, the price charged for such transactions. This is due to
the assumed timing of the depositor’s decisions. When the depositor makes a
consumption decision (chooses x), deposits have already been placed with a
bank. Hence, thedepositor’sonlyremainingdecisionistoweighthemarginal
utilityofconsumptionagainstitsprice. Here,thepriceofconsumptioniseither
zero (if the depositor is buying from a seller who uses the same bank as the
depositor)orqj foraninterbankpurchase(fromasellerthatusestheotherbank
[bankj]). Thetotalquantityofinterbanktransactionsonwhichbank0collects
q0 is z1x1. The banks’proﬁts can be written as  1 = z1p1 +z0x0(q1 −c) and
 0 = z0p0 + z1x1(q0 − c), where c is the cost to the bank of processing and
collecting on an interbank payment.6
Pricing Behavior
Thebankssetpricesforpaymentanddepositservicestomaximizetheirproﬁts,
each taking the other’s prices as given. Consider, for instance, bank 1’s proﬁt
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j is the elasticity of zi (demand for deposits at bank i) with respect to
price j;  i
j is the elasticity xi (demand for interbank payment services from
6 The proﬁt functions reﬂect the assumption (for simplicity) that variable costs of deposit
services are zero.
7 Similar conditions hold for bank 0.J.A. Weinberg: Pricing of Interbank Payment Services 57
bank i) with respect to price j; and µi =
qi−c
qi is the percent mark-up of bank
i’s interbank price over marginal cost.8
The conditions above capture the typical result that a proﬁt-maximizing
price is inversely related to the relevant (own-price) demand elasticities. The
ﬁrstconditionindicatesthat,inadditiontothepriceelasticityofitsowndeposit
demand, a bank’s choice of a price for its deposit services also depends on the
cross-price elasticity of the other bank’s deposit demand. This dependence
arises because the bank earns proﬁts by providing interbank payment services
toitsrival’sdepositors. Sincedepositsatthetwobanksaresubstituteservices,
own-price and cross-price elasticities have opposite signs; raising bank 1’s
own deposit price increases bank 0’s deposits, thereby increasing bank 1’s
interbank services. The effect is to amplify a bank’s desire to raise deposit
prices, other things being equal. The magnitude of this effect depends on the
relative contributions that payment services and deposit services make to a
bank’s proﬁts.
Asimilarinterpretationcanbegiventothesecondconditionabove. When
setting its price on payment services, a bank considers both the direct effect of
the price on its own sale of payment services and the indirect effect on its sale
of deposit services. The latter results because bank 1’s payment services are
complementary to bank 0’s deposit services, which are substitutes for bank
1’s own deposit services. Again, the strength of the indirect effect depends on
the relative contributions the two services make to a bank’s overall business.
Segmented Markets
The joint solution of the two banks’problems and the nature of the interaction
between prices of interbank payment services and prices of basic deposit
services depend on the nature of competition between the banks. In part,
the nature of interbank rivalry is determined by the structure of the banks’
external environment. In particular, the degree of integration or segmentation
of markets determines whether the banks come into face-to-face competition
with each other. This characteristic of the markets is captured by the demand
functions, and the degree of segmentation is represented by the values of the
elasticitiesηi
pj,fori  = j,andηi
qi. Theseelasticitiesreﬂecttheresponsiveness
of a bank’s deposits to the other bank’s deposit price and to its own interbank
payment price. Recall that a bank’s interbank price is paid by the other bank’s
depositors. Hence, q1 will affect z1 only if banks 1 and 0 compete directly






8 It is common to express own-price elasticities as absolute values. Here, ηi
pi and  i
qi are
deﬁned as negative numbers. This seems convenient, as own-price elasticities are combined in
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z0)(q1 − c) = 0.
Or, in terms of elasticities,
1 + η1
p1 = 0; and
1 + µ1(η0
q1 +  0
q1) = 0.
Note that even when markets are segmented, one bank’s pricing is not
entirely independent of the other bank’s prices. Each bank’s deposit demand
depends on its own deposit price and the other bank’s payment service (inter-
connection) price. That is, z1 depends on p1 and q0. Still, under segmented
markets, a bank’s pricing of its own deposit services does not interact directly
with its pricing of interbank payment services.
In the case of segmented markets, one bank’s deposit services are com-
plementary to the other bank’s interbank payment services. For instance, an
increase in q0, bank 0’s payment service price, reduces the value to potential
customers of placing deposits at bank 1. The price increase will generally
result in lower demand for bank 1 deposits and lower proﬁt-maximizing value
of p1, bank 1’s deposit price. At the same time, an increase in p0 reduces the
total value of deposits bank 0 is able to attract and correspondingly reduces
the volume of interbank transactions on which bank 1 can extract a fee. This
reduction in demand results in a lower optimal choice of q1.
Whentwosellerssetthepricesofcomplementarygoodsnoncooperatively,
the outcome is often characterized as a problem of “double-marginalization.”
In effect, the two goods can be thought of as a single service with two distinct
components. If both components were sold by a single seller with market
power, that seller would recognize the effect of each component’s price on the
sale of both components. This interdependence limits the seller’s interest in
raising prices. When the components are sold separately by different ﬁrms,
eachsellerisinterestedinonlyitsownproﬁtsandignorestheeffectsofitsprice
on the other seller’s sales. As a result, the distortion due to the deviation of
pricefrommarginalcostiscompoundedbytheindependentproﬁt-maximizing
behavior of two sellers with market power. This compound distortion comes
at the cost of both combined seller proﬁts and consumer welfare. Hence, the
independent pricing of complementary goods resembles decisionmaking in
settings with externalities. Each bank ignores the effect of its interbank price
on the sales of the other bank, and their noncooperation leads to a loss of
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this loss occurs here only because competition is imperfect and each bank
exercises some market power. If for instance there were additional banks
whosedepositandpaymentserviceswereperfectsubstitutesforthoseofbank
0, then both p0 and q0 would be competed down to marginal cost. The same
would be true for bank 1 in the presence of additional competition.
If instead of setting all prices noncooperatively, banks set their prices for
interbank services through negotiation, they can raise their combined proﬁts
by setting interbank prices (q0 and q1) lower than their noncooperative levels.
This process is formalized by assuming that q0 and q1 are set to maximize
joint proﬁts, conditional on the noncooperative determination of p0 and p1.
The process represents a mixed form of interaction between sellers in which
they collude on interbank prices while they compete in the pricing of deposit
services. For many speciﬁcations of the demand structure, the optimal nego-
tiated choice for interbank prices is to set them equal to marginal cost. This
choice eliminates the double marginalization problem, allowing banks to earn
their rents from the markup on deposit services. When deposit markets are
segmented, cooperation in setting the interbank prices is equivalent to full co-
operation in setting all prices, for banks are local monopolists in their deposit
market segments.
To see the effects of cooperating in interbank price-setting in segmented
markets, consider the ﬁrst order condition for choosing q1 to maximize joint
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(q1−c)x0. The extra term reﬂects the effect of
bank 1’s choice of interbank price q1 on bank 0’s earnings from deposits
priced at p0. The effect of the added term is to reduce the choice of q1, other
things being equal.
In segmented markets, the mechanism for jointly determining interbank
prices is not a matter of great importance. Suppose the jointly optimal inter-
bank prices are q0 = q1 = q. A relatively simple mechanism that will achieve
this result is to delegate the choice of a common interbank price to one of the
banks. That is, impose symmetry in interbank prices and let the price level be
chosen by either of the banks. Suppose this authority is granted to bank 0. Its
choice of q0 does not affect its own proﬁts, but q1 does. If the demands facing
the two banks are symmetric, then bank 0’s optimal choice is to set q0 =   q.
Bank1wouldmakethesamechoiceifitweregiventheauthoritytosettheq’s.
Hence, with segmented markets and symmetric demands, delegated setting of
reciprocal interbank prices achieves the same interbank price as would be set
under joint proﬁt maximization, subject to noncooperative choices of deposit
prices. This mechanism, then, results in lower interbank prices than would be60 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
chosen independently by the two banks. There are some cases in which this
mechanism results in interbank prices that are equal to marginal cost.
When markets are not segmented, the interaction between deposit prices
and payment service prices is more complicated. In this case, the interbank
prices (q0,q 1) are a strategic tool in competition for market share. In addition
to raising revenue for bank 0, q0 imposes a cost on bank 1’s depositors that,
other things being equal, may induce some consumers to deposit at bank 0
instead. To the extent that bank 0 is able to extract price-cost margins from
deposit customers that are large relative to markups on payment services, the
bank may ﬁnd it proﬁtable to use a high interbank price to help attract de-
posits. It is also not the case that cooperation in setting interbank prices will
necessarily improve consumer welfare. That cooperation has ambiguous con-
sequencesisoneofthemessagesoftheliteratureoninterconnectionpricingin
telecommunications networks. The interbank price could facilitate collusion
in deposit pricing by making depositors less likely to switch banks.
It may be reasonable to think of an increase in competition (or more pre-
cisely in the potential competitiveness of the market environment) as being
captured by a move from segmented markets to a single integrated market.
Such a shift could have many causes. Changes in the regulatory or legal
environment could bring banks that had previously enjoyed protected mar-
ket segments into direct competition. Improvements in technology can make
it possible for banks to serve expanding sets of customers. For instance,
consumer banking may traditionally have been a local business, with people
choosing banks based on their proximity to home or place of business. Tech-
nological advances allow consumers to make banking choices that are less
dependent on location.
If we think of increasing competition as a shift from segmented to in-
tegrated markets, then it becomes clear that the role of interbank prices can
changeinamorecompetitiveenvironment. Withlesscompetition(segmented
markets) the interbank price serves mainly as a potential source for double
marginalization. Accordingly, cooperation in setting the interbank price is
largely beneﬁcial from the point of view of consumer welfare. As markets
become more competitive (integrated), the interbank price plays a more com-
plicated strategic role.
Of course, the degree of competition between two banks also depends in
part on the behavior of the banks themselves. Is their pricing competitive, in
the sense that price determination can be modeled as the Nash equilibrium of
a noncooperative game? Or is there some amount of cooperation between the
banksintheirprice-settingbehavior? Thisaspectofthedegreeofcompetition
is more difﬁcult to tie directly to the demand and cost fundamentals of the
market. Rather, the ability of banks to collude depends on such factors as
the legal environment. In a setting with strict antitrust enforcement, it will be
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collusion. Evenso, tacitcollusionmaybepossible, intheformofcooperation
supported by implicit threats to engage in a price war should any seller cheat
on the collusive agreement.9 The feasibility of such collusion depends on
factors like sellers’ability to monitor each other’s behavior.
The foregoing discussion has assumed that banks behave as Nash price-
setters. Under that assumption, the degree of competition is determined by
the demand characteristics, as discussed above.
Suppose that banks do collude in the setting of all prices. In that case,
prices are set to maximize joint proﬁts,  0 +  1. In this case, the ﬁrst order
conditions for (for instance) (p1,q 1) are
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As with other conditions stated above, these last two can be expressed in


















z1p1 + z1x1(q0 − c)
z0x0q1
= 0.
For any given conﬁguration of demand, cooperative price-setting tends to
result in higher deposit prices (p’s) and lower payment services prices (q’s)
than does noncooperative pricing. Payment services provide interconnection
betweenbanks,allowingonebank’scustomerstouseanotherbank’sfacilities.
The prices charged for these services, then, are prices charged to another
bank’s depositors. When prices are set noncooperatively, a bank ignores the
effect that raising the payment services price has on its rival’s demand and
proﬁts. Taking this effect into account initiates cooperation, which results in
a moderation of the desire to raise this price. Hence, when banks collude
in the setting of deposit prices, either explicitly or implicitly, the role of the
interbank price resembles its role in segmented markets.
9 Green and Porter (1984).62 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
One additional issue regarding tacit (or implicit) collusion involves the
role that interbank prices might play in coordinating collusive pricing. Banks
must monitor implicit agreements not to engage in aggressive competition in
deposit prices, and the monitoring of a rival bank’s deposit arrangements with
its customers may be difﬁcult compared to monitoring prices of interbank
payment services. If, for instance, bank 1 charges a fee to bank 0’s depositor,
that fee is typically collected through bank 0 (that is, through the interbank
clearing and settlement system). Hence, bank 0 will directly observe the




The strategic interaction among banks (or ﬁrms in general ) in setting inter-
connection prices can be illustrated by an example in which consumers are
assumed to have “home” locations on the “Hotelling” line (Hotelling 1929).
That is, each consumer’s location is given by a point in the unit interval,
z ∈ [0,1]. There are two banks, located at either end point of the interval.
Thecosttoaconsumerlocatedatz ofdepositingfundsatbank0isτz,andthe
cost of depositing at bank 1 is τ(1 − z). A consumer receives utility W from
deposit services and U from payment services. One could interpret W as the
balances deposited with the bank. If the consumer is able to use his or her
deposit balances to make a purchase of goods from a store, then U will repre-
sentthenetbeneﬁtthattheconsumerreceivesfromsuchatransaction. Hence,
a “payment service” here might be a transfer of funds from the consumer’s
account to the store’s account. Alternatively, a payment service might be the
withdrawal of cash at a cash dispensing terminal close to the place where the
consumer will make a purchase. In either case, the net value received by the
consumer will be W + U minus fees paid to banks. A consumer also has
the option of not depositing funds in a bank. For simplicity, assume that by
not using bank services the consumer limits his or her ability to make certain
purchases. Specifying the value to the consumer of not depositing funds with
a bank as W captures this assumption.
Consumers face uncertainty about where they will want to consume ﬁnal
goods. This uncertainty translates into uncertainty regarding the bank from
whichtheconsumerwillneeddepositservices. Withprobabilityφ,aconsumer
needs the services of bank 0. This might be interpreted as a consumer’s desire
to transfer funds to a merchant who banks with bank 0 or as a consumer’s
need to withdraw funds from a machine owned by bank 0. With probability
(1 − φ), the consumer needs the payment services of bank 1.
Bank i bundles deposit services and payment services to its own deposi-
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the other bank’s depositors. The net beneﬁts that a consumer derives from
depositing with either bank are given by
V0 = W + U − p0 − (1 − φ)q1 − τz; and
V1 = W + U − p1 − φq0 − τ(1 − z).
If, for a given z, the greater of V0 and V1 is greater than W, then the
consumer deposits with whichever offers the greater value. Let zi denote
the consumer for whom Vi = W. Then, the case of segmented markets, as
discussed above, is the case in which z0 <z 1. In this case, there is a set
of consumers (those between z0 and z1) who do not use banking services.
Consumers between 0 and z0 deposit at bank 0, while those between z1 and 1
deposit at bank 1. Given this speciﬁcation of demand, banks’proﬁt functions
(when markets are segmented) can be written as10
 0 = z0p0 + φ(1 − z1)q0; and
 1 = (1 − z1)p1 + (1 − φ)z0q1.
This speciﬁcation of segmented markets involves a “gap” in the market
for banking services that represents consumers who choose not to deposit
their funds in the banking system. While there are, in fact, such “unbanked”
consumers in many economies (close to 10 percent of all households in the
United States), one need not take this speciﬁcation literally. The choice of
interbank prices would be similar in any setting in which a bank’s choice of q
had no effect on its own deposits. This would be true, for instance, if deposit
market segmentation were established by legal or regulatory rules.
Noncooperative price-setting by banks in this example leads to the fol-
lowing Nash equilibrium prices: p0 = p1 = U
3 ;q0 = min[ U
3φ,U];q1 =
min[ U
3(1−φ),U]. The reason interbank prices must be less than U is that con-
sumers can always choose not to use interbank services, forgoing the utility
U.With these prices, the market division is given by z0 = (1 − z1) = U
3τ,s o
that the two banks have equal market shares.11
When the noncooperative equilibrium has this segmented markets char-
acteristic, cooperation in the setting of interconnection prices is equivalent to
full cooperation in all prices. This is true because with segmented markets,
each bank is a local monopolist in its segment of the deposit services market.
Still,cooperationresultsinapreferredoutcomeforbothbanksandconsumers.
10 For simplicity, this example assumes that the marginal costs of both deposit and payment
services are zero. Assuming positive marginal costs would not alter the nature of the strategic
interaction among banks. However, assuming a higher marginal cost for interbank payment services
than for same bank services would add an important dimension to the efﬁciency properties of
equilibrium allocations.
11 This characterization of the equilibrium assumes that τ>2
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Under this pricing scenario, interbank prices (q0,q 1) are set equal to marginal
cost (q0 = q1 = 0), and deposit prices are p0 = p1 = U
2 . Hence, deposit
prices go up while interbank charges go down. The net effect on consumer
welfare is positive, as is demonstrated by the fact that more consumers choose
to use bank services under this pricing scenario than under noncooperative
pricing. With the cooperative prices, market shares are z0 = z1 = U
2τ.
Whether the equilibrium features segmented or integrated markets de-
pends, of course, on the parameters of the model. In particular, U gives
the value of having access to payment services, and τ gives the consumer’s
marginal cost of using bank services. As τ gets smaller or U gets bigger,
more consumers will seek to use bank services, and eventually the marginal
consumer’s decision will be between banks rather than whether to deposit at
all. When the market becomes integrated in this way, banks’ shares of the
market are determined by the point (z), at which a consumer is indifferent







[(p1 + φq0) − (p0 + (1 − φ)q1)],
and banks’proﬁt functions are
 0 =ˆ zp0 + φ(1 −ˆ z)q0,
 1 = (1 −ˆ z)p1 + (1 − φ)ˆ zq0.
Under these conditions, banks have a heightened incentive to raise the
interconnection price compared to the case of segmented markets. With seg-
mented markets, q0 has no effect on bank 0’s sale of deposit services to its
own customers. Here, raising q0 raises the cost to consumers of depositing
with bank 1. When the market is integrated, any loss of depositors by bank 1
is matched by a gain at bank 0. Indeed, in this example the proﬁt-maximizing
choice for q0 and q1 is q0 = q1 = U. Deposit prices are then p0 = 2τ + φU
and p0 = 2τ + (1 − φ)U.
With an integrated market, it is no longer true that banks can raise their
combined proﬁts by agreeing to lower interconnection prices. In particular,
each bank’s proﬁts are lower if interconnection prices are set at marginal
cost. That is, cooperation on interbank prices alone does not tend to drive
those prices down to marginal cost. On the other hand, if banks collude on
both interbank and deposit prices, then joint proﬁts are maximized by setting
interbank prices equal to zero.12
12Actually, in this example, where consumers end up using either zero or one unit of inter-
bank services, the joint proﬁt maximizing solution determines only the sums p0 + (1 − φ)q1 and
p1 + φq0. In an extended example, with downward sloping demand for interbank services, joint
maximization would drive the interbank prices to marginal cost.J.A. Weinberg: Pricing of Interbank Payment Services 65
3. CONCLUSION
In many economies, the business of banking is undergoing profound changes.
Boundaries between markets, both geographically and in terms of product
lines, are being removed by regulatory changes and technological advances.
These changes present challenges to traditional ways of handling interbank
clearing and settlement arrangements. If the terms for interbank transactions
are established by industry-based, collaborative organizations, how will such
arrangements respond to the entry of new market participants? This article
has suggested that increasing (though still imperfect) competition creates a
complicated set of incentives for banks with regard to the terms for inter-
bank payment services. Neither competition nor cooperation in setting these
prices is guaranteed to always yield desirable results from the point of view
of consumer welfare. This does not necessarily imply the need for a regula-
tory mechanism in determining interbank prices. The development of such
a mechanism, managed by a governmental authority, is subject to its own
drawbacks—including, for instance, the difﬁculty faced by a regulator in ob-
tainingtheinformationnecessarytosetoptimalinterconnectionprices. Rather
than direct regulation, however, there may be call to carefully monitor of in-
dustry practices in interconnection pricing. Such monitoring was perhaps less
important in an environment with less direct competition among banks. It
is somewhat ironic, then, that increasing competition may actually increase
concerns for the competitive impact of interbank payment services pricing.
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